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Introduction  
 
The role of ideology in the processes of radicalisation is one of the key contested factors in 
the literature on radicalisation, with a fundamental assumption in parts of radicalisation 
research positing that individuals become gradually radicalised in their ideas, attitudes, 
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Abstract 
In some schools of thought of radicalisation research there is a tacit assumption 
that individuals become gradually radicalised in their ideas, attitudes, political 
preferences and worldview, and then motivated by this subsequently radicalise 
their actions to commit an act of terrorism. This article supports those who 
question this linear model and I argue that these two processes, which are here 
labelled as ideological and behavioural radicalisation, must be differentiated. 
Drawing on ideas from radicalisation in genocide studies, this article contributes 
to the social movement theory approaches to terrorism. As such, the article 
differentiates between ideological and behavioural radicalisation processes and 
argues that these two types of radicalisation can be sequenced with either first. 
This article posits that it is possible for individuals to engage in radical actions 
without having extreme preferences, just as it is equally possible for other 
individuals to have radical ideologies without acting on them, supporting more 
social movement theory approaches to radicalisation. The article provides a 
plausibility probe for this sequencing, demonstrating its empirical utility for 
participation in genocidal violence. 
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political preferences and worldview, and then motivated by this subsequently radicalise their 
actions to commit an act of terrorism.1 Other parts of the literature, which I aim to support 
with this article, argue that these two processes, which are here labelled as ideological and 
behavioural radicalisation, must be differentiated. Although this has been discussed in 
previous academic work on the topic,2 most notably Peter Neumann’s cognitive and 
behavioural radicalisation,3 this article aims to strengthen and conceptually underpin this part 
of the literature, particularly reflecting on how these two forms of radicalisation can be 
sequenced. Max Abrahms’ reminder that “terrorism is an extremism of means, not ends”4 is 
instructive here and emphasises the importance of differentiating the behavioural from the 
ideological processes of radicalisation. As such, contributions from social movement theory 
and social psychology can better account for these alternative ideas than standard phase 
models that expect a very clear ideological then behavioural radicalisation.5  
While a wide body of the literature that deals explicitly with radicalisation focuses on 
participation in terrorist activity, predominantly Islamist terrorism, the underlying research 
interests are also pertinent to the study of participation in a variety of other types of violence, 
such as genocide, riots, pogroms, lynching etc. The overwhelming majority of previous work 
on participation in genocide and the insights from studying this type of radical behaviour have 
inspired this article, leading me to question the assumption about the sequencing of 
radicalisation present in many phase models of terrorism. Empirically, for genocide 
participation this ideological-behavioural sequencing is only the case for a minority of 
individuals. Instead, most individuals will become ideologically radical only as a consequence 
of their behavioural radicalisation. Thus, it is possible for people to be behaviourally radical, 
but not ideologically, just as it is widely accepted in the radicalisation literature that people 
can radicalise ideologically without then actually enacting the radical behaviour in the end.  
This article explores how these two forms of ideological and behavioural 
radicalisation co-exist and influence each other, particularly by studying tacit expectations 
about their sequencing and highlighting insights from the study of participation in genocide. 
Although mostly only referring to this differentiation indirectly, several previous 
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radicalisation models in terrorism studies assume that ideological radicalisation precedes 
behavioural radicalisation. While different theoretical approaches to radicalisation differ 
significantly in their explanations of how people become radicalised in their ideas and why 
they will join a terrorist group, many assume that people will alter their political preferences 
and thus ideologically radicalise before they actually commit an act of terrorism. The main 
argument laid out in this article is that this sequencing need not be necessary, supporting 
schools of thought that appeal to a more nuanced appreciation of the role of ideology in 
radicalisation, for example with social movement theory emphasising how ideologies work as 
‘collective action frames’6 or play a de-emphasised role.7 Conceptually, it is plausible that 
someone acts radically for entirely other reasons before his or her ideas have become 
radicalised and empirically there are cases which can be better explained this way. 
Empirically, it is unclear whether behavioural radicalisation more often precedes ideological 
radicalisation,8 or whether the processes expected by phase models with a prior ideological 
radicalisation are more prevalent, although further rigorous empirical research will 
conclusively allow an evaluation of the empirical relevance of this alternate proposal. I concur 
here with Neumann’s assessment that the processes of ideological (or cognitive as he terms it) 
and behavioural radicalisation are intertwined to a certain degree and that it would not be 
fruitful to study behavioural radicalisation independently;9 however, this paper provides an 
abstract conceptualisation of how these are brought together in genocide and radicalisation 
studies. The main argument reads that most radicalisation studies – across schools – assume 
some form of ideological radicalisation (be it through buying into collective frames or 
becoming a believer) precedes behavioural radicalisation, but that the sequencing could also 
be reversed. 
Drawing on previous work on participation in genocide,10 this paper demonstrates how 
this alternative sequencing can play out empirically and what other factors may impact this 
process of behavioural radicalisation which do not necessitate a previous ideological 
radicalisation; people can act in radicalised ways without having the extreme political 
preferences that one would expect. As such, this article does not deny that for many 
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radicalised individuals ideological radicalisation does indeed occur prior to behavioural 
radicalisation, but the argument is that it is conceptually and empirically important to 
recognise that an alternative sequencing is possible and does occur. With this systematisation, 
studies of radicalisation can differentiate with a more nuanced approach between the two 
substantively different processes of ideological and behavioural radicalisation and see how 
their sequencing may differ to previous expectations.  
Thus, this article contributes to the social movement theory stream of the 
radicalisation literature, embracing their arguments about the importance of non-ideological 
motivations in recruitment to the terrorist group and non-ideologically motivated behavioural 
radicalisation.11 As such, the innovative contribution of this piece is not the argument that 
ideological radicalisation does not always precede behavioural radicalisation, as this has also 
been shown elsewhere, but instead, first, the application of empirical insights from genocide 
studies to these questions within the study of radicalisation and, second, the systematic 
conceptualisation of how this sequencing can occur. It should be emphasised that the focus 
here lies on the participating individuals, the radicalising individuals who become terrorists or 
genocide perpetrators, not on the motivations and dynamics of the group itself. As such, this 
article is not a contribution to the literature on the rationality or strategic value of terrorism, 
but instead stands in the tradition of Charles Tilly who argues for a differentiation between the 
motivations of individuals and the social dynamics that produce collective violence and a 
more relational approach to understanding these processes.12 This paper is in line with social 
movement theory approaches, and in drawing on previous ideas from genocide studies 
provides a systematic way of enriching existing thought in parts of radicalisation studies about 
actions and preferences, behavioural and ideological radicalisation. It is this systematic 
approach that provides a heuristic that could be helpful for thinking about individual pathways 
into terrorism. 
This article is what Alexander George and Andrew Bennett term a plausibility probe, 
that is a “preliminary stud[y] on relatively untested theories and hypotheses to determine 
whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted.”13 This kind of plausibility probe 
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helps to “focus directly on the goal of theory development, by aiming at clearer specification 
of a theory and its variables.”14 As such, the article does not provide a detailed empirical case 
study of a terrorist that fits the bill here to demonstrate the utility of the argument but 
discusses it conceptually and make the case for its plausibility drawing on the extensive 
literature that has discussed this for the study of genocide. My contribution is to interrogate 
conceptually in as much detail as possible how we can re-think radicalisation processes from 
a genocide studies perspective. By providing more clarity in specifying radicalisation 
processes as behavioural and ideological, and thinking about their alternative sequencing, it 
becomes possible for radicalisation researchers to re-visit their data and to see whether the 
conceptually plausible sequencing has empirical bearing that can parallel the findings from 
genocide studies. I will not be presenting a full empirical test of these ideas in this paper 
because there is no adequate data that would allow for rigorous and in-depth analysis. This is 
because, first, most data until now has been presented in a way that adheres to the traditional 
assumptions regarding sequencing, which means it is difficult to use this data to demonstrate 
my points as the way the individuals’ stories are told already neglect some of the details 
which may allow for my alternative interpretation. Second, in most cases data on individuals 
is not presented in enough depth in the literature that I could build my own case from a 
specific individual. As such, this article will provide a conceptual discussion as a plausibility 
probe drawing on the insights gained from the study of participation in genocide, and future 
research endeavours will need to conduct in-depth re-evaluations of previous case studies or 
generate new data that can be analysed along these lines.  
To substantiate this argument, I will first briefly review some of the main approaches 
to radicalisation to demonstrate the presence of a latent assumption that ideological 
radicalisation precedes behavioural radicalisation in parts of the literature. Next, I present the 
alternative sequencing of radicalisation that exist in other parts of the radicalisation literature 
and empirically illustrate this for radicalisation in the context of participating in genocide. 
Subsequently, I discuss what kind of factors can be relevant for leading to behavioural 
radicalisation if not ideological radicalisation and ask what consequences this could have for 
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counterterrorism policy, before concluding with an outlook of what this alternative 
perspective could mean for research on radicalisation. 
 
Previous Approaches to Conceptualising Radicalisation into Terrorism 
 
When one reviews the burgeoning field research on radicalisation into – predominantly 
Islamist – terrorism, one is struck by the diversity of explanations and approaches, ranging 
from phase models to broad factor models, from psychological or pathological approaches to 
social movement theory approaches, among many others. While different researchers often 
operate with diverging definitions15 and some are more narrowly focussed on terrorism while 
others are broader, most of these approaches see radicalisation as a one-dimensional 
progression. Some focus on radicalisation as an ideological phenomenon of supporting violent 
means against an outgroup and seeing these as legitimate, that is taking on political 
preferences that support these acts; in this perspective radicalisation is a process which then 
can lead to violence if one is radicalised enough. While arguing against this type of 
understanding, Abrahms attests a widespread conflation of ideology and behaviour positing 
that we “are apt to infer the extremeness of a challenger’s preferences directly from the 
extremeness of his tactics notwithstanding the nature of his actual demands” and he suggests 
that there is a “human tendency to confound the extreme means of the challenger with his 
presumed ends.”16 In this sense, John Horgan’s approach to focussing on the psychology of 
behavioural radicalisation emphasises its disjuncture with radical thoughts and ideologies and 
that there are few, if any, consistent psychological patterns17 and the importance of 
disaggregating different types of radicalised behaviour;18 however, this does mask the 
important role that ideological radicalisation can play for some individuals either prior to or 
after behavioural radicalisation.19 
However, some authors do indeed de-couple the ideas and differentiate between 
radicalising attitudes and ideas and engaging in action which is violent and extremist. Most 
explicitly and prominently Donatella Della Porta and Gary LaFree make this differentiation 
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and acknowledge that they are causally independent of each other.20 Randy Borum also 
differentiates between radicalisation as “the process of developing extremist ideologies and 
beliefs” and “action pathways (or action scripts)” as “the process of engaging in terrorism or 
violent extremist actions” and also argue that these can each occur without the other.21 
Similarly, Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko differentiate these two radicalisation 
processes22 and state that their order can vary.23 These differentiations are a welcome 
development in radicalisation research and in this article I build on this differentiation 
between what I will call ideological radicalisation and behavioural radicalisation. Ideological 
radicalisation I understand to be an increasing adherence to and purporting of ideological 
beliefs and political preferences that support, justify and demand the discrimination, attack or 
even annihilation of an outgroup. Behavioural radicalisation, on the other hand, is the 
participation in actions which increasingly serve this purpose of discrimination, attack or even 
annihilation of the outgroup. 
Nonetheless, much research is still based on a fundamental assumption that ideological 
radicalisation comes before behavioural radicalisation. This assumption is made by not only 
by some of those who differentiate between the two types of radicalisation, but also implicitly 
by others who do not. While most phase model radicalisation theories do not claim that 
extremist ideas must lead to violence, that is ideological radicalisation to behavioural 
radicalisation, they also do not assume that behavioural radicalisation can occur 
independently of ideological radicalisation. A stark example of this would be the assertion 
that “although every terrorist is a radical, not every radical is a terrorist,”24 effectively arguing 
that violent action is only possible if one has the corresponding, ideologically aligned political 
preferences.  
The common nature of this sequencing is exemplified in the influential social 
scientific model by Quintan Wictorowicz which prescribes four stages of radicalisation, 
focussing on Islamist terrorism. This model begins with ‘cognitive opening’ in which an 
individual becomes receptive to radical ideas, is followed by ‘religious seeking’ in which the 
person directs this towards the worldview of radical religious groups, subsequently the 
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individual defers to the authority of this interpretation in a ‘frame alignment’ stage, before 
finally in a stage of ‘socialising and joining’ the individual joins the group. Any behavioural 
radicalisation is theorised to occur subsequently to this.25 Another prominent example is 
Fathali Moghaddam’s ‘staircase to terrorism’ in which stages go from group-based feelings of 
relative deprivation, to seeking to improve this situation and feel blocked and become angry at 
an identified enemy, subsequently engaging with the morality of terrorist organisations and 
accepting their strategies as justified, then joining the group and ultimately carrying out 
terrorist acts.26 Also, Marc Sageman, while not working from analysing stages, speaks of four 
key factors, three cognitive (moral outrage, a specific frame interpreting the world, resonance 
of this with personal experience of discrimination) and a situational one which sees like-
minded individuals interacting and mobilisation occurring through networks; whereas these 
four factors work in parallel, again only subsequent to this mobilisation into a terrorist 
organisation does terrorist action occur.27 The prominent radicalisation process used by the 
NYPD sees sequenced stages of ‘pre-radicalisation,’ ‘self-identification,’ ‘indoctrination,’ and 
finally ‘jihadisation,’ a clear progression from ideological to behavioural radicalisation.28  
The modelling of ideological radicalisation preceding behavioural radicalisation was 
made quite explicit in a recent psychological contribution by Bertjan Doosje et al. who also 
emphasise the possibility of de-radicalisation or non-progression along the continuum, but 
who do not conceptualise as possible radical action coming before radical ideas (what they 
term ‘sensitivity’).29 Similarly, Jytte Klausen et al.’s sequence of pre-radicalisation, 
detachment, peer immersion and steps to action differentiates between ideologies and 
behaviour but sequences them rigidly in this order.30 The sequencing of ideological followed 
by possibly behavioural radicalisation is the same also in cognitive theories, such as the Root 
Cause approach to radicalisation.31 The focus of this theory lies on the complexity of 
individual-level factors which cause radicalisation but an emphasis is placed on how 
‘embedded individuals’ are radicalised through the development of radicalised social 
identities, although it differs strongly from phase models in its openness to social dynamics 
being the foundation of this.32 Sequencing is again the same in the ‘Quest for Significance 
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Model’ which sees people’s radical behaviour rooted in a terrorist-justifying ideologies.33 In 
similar terms, Joshua Sinai’s model,34 the policy-relevant model by Tomas Precht for the 
Danish Ministry of Justice35 and the FBI36 models assume this fundamental sequencing of 
some form of ideological radicalisation (for various reasons), subsequent joining of a radical 
group and then radical action from within this group. In an important and useful synthesis of 
many previous phase models, Stéphanie De Coensel does identify the phase for ideological 
radicalisation as relatively late, however, the sequencing is again similar with it preceding 
behavioural radicalisation.37 
Despite its broader conception of pathways into radicalisation, social movement 
theory also does not embrace the full potential of differentiating between ideological and 
behavioural radicalisation. Although social movement theory approaches acknowledge that 
individuals may join radical organisations for non-ideological reasons, such as friendship or 
kin ties which pull them in,38 some still assume that for behavioural radicalisation to occur, 
the individual will become radicalised ideologically first, albeit emphasising the important 
role the social group has in framing the situation and fostering this radicalisation process.39 
Thus, many stipulate that there are other reasons for joining the radical organisation, but do 
not go further to argue that there could also be other reasons for the individuals to radicalise 
behaviourally. This paper’s core argument is that this indeed is plausible and is well 
established for radicalisation in the context of genocidal violence. 
As such, while they differ considerably in their interpretation of why and how people 
are radicalised, many approaches implicitly or explicitly assume a sequencing of ideological 
and behavioural radicalisation, with the former preceding the latter and implicitly stipulating 
that it should be seen as a prerequisite. 
 
Insights from Studying Radicalisation in Genocide 
 
Having established how parts of the literature on terrorism conceptualise radicalisation, this 
section turns to the topic of genocide perpetration, radicalisation in the context of a different 
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type of political violence. More specifically, this section demonstrates empirically an 
alternative form of sequencing by which people become radicalised behaviourally without 
previously having been ideologically radicalised. I draw particularly on the conceptual 
Complexity of Evil model that explains why people participate in genocide.40  
In this context of genocide, behavioural radicalisation means that the individual 
participates in the killing of victims, while ideological radicalisation is constituted by 
increasingly hostile attitudes towards these victims which runs along ideological lines. Some 
men and women within a genocidal context are indeed radicalised behaviourally for 
ideological reasons, that is due to an ideological radicalisation. However, most people are 
not.41 Instead, they radicalise behaviourally due to a plethora of reasons, particularly relating 
to social dynamics within the perpetrator group and opportunistic motivations. In terms of 
social dynamics in the perpetrator group, for example, people can behaviourally radicalise 
into participating in genocide due to being obedient to the orders of an authority.42 This has 
most impressively been demonstrated by the psychologist Stanley Milgram who showed in 
his experiments that most people were prepared to engage in action they believed harmed 
others significantly, simply because someone perceived as a legitimate authority had ordered 
it.43 This is salient for many cases of genocide when often “killing became akin to policy”44 
and was seen by perpetrators as “the law.”45 Furthermore, peer pressure and wanting to be 
conform with one’s comrades or friends can serve as a strong motivation for behavioural 
radicalisation, and as such individuals may not accept ideologically the reasons for 
participating but nonetheless conform to group norms in action.46 This is evocatively 
evidenced in Lee Ann Fujii’s portrayal of participation in the Rwandan genocide in which 
group ties were key in recruiting ‘volunteer’ perpetrators and these ties also forged an identity 
within this group.47 Further, coercion through threatened or actual violence is a further 
motivation, whether threats are credible or not.48 People who refused to participate could be 
killed during the genocide in Rwanda49 and the Armenian genocide,50 but nowhere was 
coercion more broadly used than in Cambodia, where fear was “endemic”51 and people were 
constantly in fear for their life if any hint of disobedience was detected.52 Also in this context 
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some individuals seek to improve their status within the group through radicalising their 
behaviour, for example with Khmer Rouge who participated in the killing having a higher 
status.53 
Beyond these group-based dynamics, a further swathe of opportunistic motivations 
can also make people radicalise behaviourally without an ideological radicalisation. For 
example, people may radicalise their behaviour in order to forward their career through 
promotion rewards or to enrich themselves through participation,54 such as by receiving the 
opportunity to loot and steal from the victim group.55 Another opportunistic motivation to 
radicalise is in order to be able to eliminate political rivals and get ahead56 or to resolve 
personal conflicts pre-dating the genocide, for example, a woman in Rwanda killed a man 
who had previously refused to lend her money.57 Others hope to be able to receive perks for 
their participation, for instance Khmer Rouge who participated in the killing were given 
minimally more and better food, as well as less gruelling work conditions than their 
compatriots.58 As with many types of crime, the thrill and excitement of doing something 
forbidden motivates some, often younger people to participate,59 as can the sadistic pleasure 
found in hurting others.60 
While some people radicalise behaviourally in genocide due to ideological 
convictions, this section has demonstrated that there are also various other motivations that 
can allow people to radicalise behaviourally without such an ideological radicalisation. I am 
not arguing that these will necessarily be the same factors that motivate behavioural 
radicalisation in other forms of violence such as terrorism. Instead, the point is that other 
plausible motivations for this behavioural radicalisation can exist and that we need to consider 
how behavioural radicalisation can thus be seen in an independent light to ideological 
radicalisation. 
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Sequencing Radicalisation 
 
First, I presented some phase models of radicalisation into terrorism and in the previous 
section as a contrast I discussed various factors that can contribute to behavioural 
radicalisation independent of ideological radicalisation. In this section now I will demonstrate 
how these differ analytically, clarifying the argument regarding the difference between 
behavioural and ideological radicalisation. What is proposed here is neither a full phase 
model, such as the ‘staircase to terrorism,’61 nor any other type of full explanatory model; 
rather in the spirit of this plausibility probe research design, what I provide is a heuristic for 
differentiating between ideological and behavioural radicalisation and for contemplating how 
these forms of radicalisation can be sequenced. As such, ideological radicalisation can follow 
on from behavioural radicalisation, and does not have to be its precedent. Thus, this heuristic 
should help in our thinking about how we can study radicalisation better and how we can look 
at radicalisation from a more nuanced perspective, inspired by the study of participation in 
genocide. 
Figure 1 presents a graphic representation of this sequencing argument, several 
examples of which were discussed above. While the first line summarizes previous academic 
debates, the second one introduces my alternative approach. 
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Figure 1: Sequencing behavioural and ideological radicalisation 
 
The standard phase model of radicalisation 
The first line of Figure 1 is concurrent with many terrorist radicalisation studies, 
particularly those purporting some form of phase model, but is also applicable to ideological 
perpetrators of genocide. Prototypically, this means that, first, an individual gradually adopts 
hostile ideologies towards another group (be it a targeted minority, such as the Tutsi or the 
Jews, or a societal majority, such as Northern Irish protestants or liberal Westerners); how 
gradual or expedite this process is will depend strongly on the individual and their context. In 
this way the individual’s political preferences will become more and more extreme and he or 
she will become ideologically radicalised.  
Second, motivated by these radicalising political preferences, the individual joins an 
organisation which is known to forward these ideologies, either by proactively seeking the 
organisation out or by being ‘cognitively open’62 to the cause and being pulled into the 
organisation. While the static representation suggested here cannot adequately portray this, 
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the ideological radicalisation will continue, possibly even accelerate once membership into 
this organisation has occurred.  
In a third step, the individual then engages in violent action against the hated outgroup 
from within their new role in the organisation, radicalising behaviourally, again either 
gradually engaging in ever more discriminatory and violent behaviour or immediately going 
the whole way, e.g. participating in a massacre of civilians in genocide or participating in a 
terrorist attack. This sequencing of events can vary and social movement theory proponents 
within the radicalisation literature would be right in pointing out that membership in the group 
can precede ideological radicalisation when people are brought in through personal ties. The 
emphasis of this first part is on the ideological preceding the behavioural, though, so it 
remains compatible with both phase models and social movement theory approaches.  
 
An alternative approach to sequencing radicalisation 
The second line of figure 1 shows an alternative approach to sequencing radicalisation 
and will be discussed in more detail to underscore the argument I am making of its validity. 
The first step is joining the perpetrator organisation, that is the terrorist cell or a military, 
paramilitary, police, neighbourhood watch or other unit which participates in violence against 
civilians. The important point here is that the individual is not yet ideologically radicalised 
and joins for non-ideological reasons, for example, in genocidal contexts people are often 
conscripted into these organisations, or they are already members before the organisation 
itself has its area of responsibility re-defined to include the genocidal action; there are many 
different reasons people may join these organisations beyond ideological radicalisation, as 
social movement theory advocates have convincingly demonstrated. This non-ideological 
joining of a terrorist organisation is widely recognised in terrorism studies as people join due 
to previous friendship or kinship ties, a desire for social meaning and an escape from social 
isolation or a drive to experience thrills and the excitement of participating.63 
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The second step, however, diverges from most social movement theory and other 
radicalisation approaches as now the individual radicalises behaviourally and participates in 
violent action. Abrahms sums up this possibility that behavioural radicalisation does not need 
to be preceded by ideological radicalisation: 
“There is comparatively strong theoretical and empirical evidence that people become 
terrorists not to achieve their organization’s declared political agenda, but to develop 
strong affective ties with other terrorist members. In other words, the preponderance of 
evidence is that people participate in terrorist organizations for the social solidarity, 
not for their political return.”64  
This process of behavioural radicalisation without the extreme preferences associated with 
ideological radicalisation is evidenced by people who participate in jihadi terrorism but 
without holding deep convictions regarding their Islamic faith, for example, Sadi Abdallah 
who was part of the so-called Al-Zarqawi cell in Germany that had plotted to attack Jewish 
targets in large German cities,65 Mourad Benchellali who was a member of the so-called 
‘Chechen network’ in France that underwent training in Chechnya and returned to plot attacks 
against Russian and French institutions in Paris,66 or José Emilio Suarez Trashorras who was 
involved in the Madrid bombings of March 2004 that killed over 200 people in commuter 
trains.67 All of these men participated in the behavioural radicalisation, planning or executing 
attacks and in the case of Benchellali training actively for them abroad, even though they 
claim not to be at all religious.68 A further pertinent example is provided by Saudi recruits to 
al-Qaida in the late 1990s and early 2000s who travelled to Afghanistan, radicalising their 
behaviour in training camps and fighting, not in pursuit of the global jihad and other radical 
ideas, but because of social networks they were embedded in. These people’s motivations 
were based on compassion for their perceived in-group and not related to the broader 
radicalised ideologies and radical notions of jihad or international terror.69  
Similarly, sometimes terrorists who radicalise behaviourally do not even have a 
rudimentary knowledge of the organisation’s political goals, as demonstrated by the case of 
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the IRA where many recruits only acquired the political orientations after joining the group 
and having participated in radical behaviour such as street riots.70 This is succinctly 
highlighted by Rogelio Alonso whose detailed study of the IRA in Northern Ireland shows 
that 
“many of the young people who joined the IRA did not have a developed political 
motivation based on strong ideological foundations. […] In most cases, they 
joined the IRA at an impressionable and emotionally immature age […]. After 
recruitment, the procedures put into practice were aimed at reinforcing opinions 
that had hardly been thought through, so that recruits had drilled into them the 
comforting guarantee that the violence perpetrated was a response to a political 
need rather than a criminal impulse.”71  
More recently, European youths have been travelling to Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic 
State who cannot be said to have prior religious convictions but a desire for delinquency and 
behavioural radicalisation which only receives a post-hoc religious justification of jihad,72 
while some youths radicalising in Germany have been shown to have only very superficial 
religious knowledge.73  
Thirdly, then, once someone has behaviourally radicalised, they can then ideologically 
radicalise. in the standard sequencing of radicalisation above (and as explicitly stated in most 
phase models), most individuals who ideologically radicalise do not go the next step to 
joining an organisation despite their extreme preferences and only some of these then actually 
behaviourally radicalise. In this alternative sequencing, however, this third step of ideological 
radicalisation is present for most individuals who have behaviourally radicalised due to 
cognitive dissonance. Under normal circumstances people avoid behaviour which violates 
their moral standards; if people do behave at odds to their moral standards, cognitive 
dissonance occurs. This cognitive dissonance is inherently problematic as it undermines “the 
integrity of the self”74 and people cannot live with the cognitive dissonance over a long period 
of time.75 Thus, individuals attempt to resolve this tension and reduce the discrepancy 
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between behaviour and ideologies.76 There are two possible solutions to this cognitive 
dissonance: on the one hand, one can de-radicalise behaviour, acknowledging that it was 
wrong. However, this can be extremely difficult within coercive structures or in a group 
setting in which most such action occurs. On the other hand, it can become psychologically 
attractive to alter one’s preferences and moral framework rather than adapt one’s behaviour 
and thus the person can radicalise ideologically. This process is often supported by 
propaganda which is purported by the organisation and morally justifies and legitimises the 
behavioural radicalisation or provides hostile constructions of the enemy which provide an 
easy solution to the arisen cognitive dissonance.   
 
Combining (Non-)Radical Behaviour and Ideologies 
 
Figure 2: Typology differentiating degree of ideological and behavioural radicalisation  
 Non-radical 
ideologies 
Radical 
ideologies 
Radical  
behaviour 
Unideological 
perpetrators, otherwise 
motivated 
  Ideological perpetrators + 
unideological perpetrators 
avoiding cognitive dissonance  
Non-radical  
behaviour 
‘ordinary’ members of society 
(the majority of most societies) 
Hostile and discriminating, but 
inactive  
 
Figure 2 visualises this differentiation between behavioural and ideological radicalisation, 
showing four prototypical types. The vast majority of most societies will be located in the 
bottom left-hand quadrant as people who are neither radical in their ideologies nor in their 
behaviour. Some of these can radicalise ideologically placing them in the bottom right-hand 
quadrant, which is constituted by those who are not (yet) behaviourally radicalised, but who 
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are ideologically radical, showing hostile and discriminating preferences towards the target 
group. In a genocidal society, for example, this can be quite a large amount of people, 
particularly if the government engages in large-scale propaganda campaigns. In many terrorist 
radicalisation phase models, this quadrant is discussed as the first step and it is often 
emphasised that the majority of people who ideologically radicalise will not subsequently also 
radicalise behaviourally. Those who do radicalise behaviourally then end up in the top right-
hand quadrant which consists of those people who act radically and have deep-seated beliefs 
regarding why they are acting like this, believing in the cause they are acting for. Thus, phase 
models assume a transition from the bottom left, to the bottom right and then up to the top 
right as subsequent radicalisation processes. It remains open at which point the individual 
precisely joins the terrorist group, with social movement theory advocates stipulating that this 
can occur prior to ideological radicalisation, while proponents of phase models would assume 
that joining such an organisation would occur more in the bottom right-hand corner.  
The alternative I am suggesting in this article adds the logical possibility of the top 
left-hand quadrant which sees people acting radically but without the radical ideologies 
accompanying individuals in the quadrant to its right. They can become radicalised for a 
number of reasons discussed briefly above, but can still be moderate in their beliefs. However, 
the arrow between the two top quadrants signifies that this transition from non-radical to 
radical ideologies will often occur once someone has radicalised behaviourally in order to 
avoid cognitive dissonance. The transition is not necessary, as the individual could remain in 
the top left-hand quadrant and suffer the cognitive dissonance or he or she could transition 
back to the bottom left-hand quadrant, but this is relatively unlikely in the type of group 
setting in which behavioural radicalisation has already occurred, and also it does not help to 
resolve cognitive dissonance for past actions. While most individuals will follow the arrow 
and radicalise ideologically, it is open to which degree this ideological radicalisation will 
occur. It is plausible that this will be less pronounced for these people as it is not about an 
ideological conviction which demands such action but radical preferences which allow and 
justify the actions one has participated in that suffice to waylay the cognitive dissonance. 
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A final issue regards the role of time in this alternative sequencing. While it does occur that 
an individual may radicalise behaviourally very fast, for example, when reserve order police 
battalions were ordered to eradicate the Jewish populations of Polish villages which could not 
be deported from during the Holocaust.77 Here, the men had almost no experience with 
genocidal violence beforehand, but most participated on the spur of the moment. In other 
cases, such as the genocide in Cambodia, most perpetrators became more gradually 
radicalised behaviourally, as they were most often recruited into relatively innocuous 
positions to begin with and then were re-assigned to new positions progressively getting 
closer to the locus of violence;78 a prototypical example in this case is Hang who was 
recruited into a child unit first, before then being given military training; subsequently he was 
made a guard outside the walls of a security centre, making sure no-one was able to get in or 
out, before then moving to be an inside guard, actually guarding the prisoners and preparing 
them for interrogation, torture and execution.79 In such cases, in which the behavioural 
radicalisation does not occur at once, the ideological radicalisation can also occur step-by-step 
in reaction to the increasing severity of actions, so that intermediate stages of cognitive 
dissonance can be avoided. It is important to emphasise that here it is not the incremental 
radicalisation in terms of ideas which necessarily have to radicalise the behaviour, but that the 
incremental behavioural radicalisation can lead to incremental ideological radicalisation as 
step-by-step cognitive dissonance is sought to be avoided. 
Implications for counterterrorism practice 
This alternative sequencing of radicalisation processes has consequences for how we should 
think about preventing radicalisation and counterterrorism policies. Counterterrorism 
strategies are needed that differentiate between the traditional sequencing and my proposed 
alternative, as my argument is not that the former does not exist empirically, but that the 
alternative explanation is also empirically relevant. However, even within the new alternative 
the step of behavioural radicalisation can be motivated by a number of factors, including not 
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only social dynamics within the terrorist group, but also opportunistic motivations, the desire 
for an exciting adventure, or even sadistic pleasure (for a small number of people). Thus, a 
good counterterrorism strategy will be adaptive, reactive and multi-faceted, tailoring a variety 
of programmes to different types of potential terrorists and the complex nature of their 
potential motivations for radicalisation. 
I concur with Abrahm’s analysis that the three most common counterterrorism 
strategies, namely “withholding political concessions, granting political concessions, or 
providing nonviolent political alternatives,”80 fail in combating terrorism as they are premised 
on the assumption that terrorists primarily pursue rational, political goals. His proposals to 
invest in social network analyses to identify members of terrorist organisations and to attempt 
to break up social networks through sowing distrust do appear promising, but the broader 
suggestion of fostering inclusion of at-risk populations will certainly be key to 
counterterrorism efforts. Besides the obviously beneficial societal value of such projects, the 
effect of broadening social networks is that people are less likely to be in just one sub-group 
that is perceived as very different to the rest of society, perhaps even threatened by it. 
However, the most important implication that the proposed alternative sequencing has 
for counterterrorism policy is the futility of only flagging ideological radicalisation and 
focussing on people who appear to be ideologically radicalising as a warning for behavioural 
radicalisation. As such, public diplomacy approaches that emphasise changing population’s 
hostile ideologies may be ineffective because at least some people are turning to terrorism and 
only later taking on hostile views, so that changing their views does not prevent the act of 
terrorism itself. Instead, incremental steps of behavioural radicalisation could be much more 
important to monitor as a baseline, focussing more on broader programmes that provide a 
more supportive environment so that people do not decide to radicalise behaviourally. At the 
same time, this is not supposed to read as an argument for the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ approach to 
counter-radicalisation that neglects ideological radicalisation entirely and focusses explicitly 
on extremist action,81 but instead to reflect on measures in a way that allows for these 
alternative sequencings. 
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Conclusion 
 
This article has presented a plausibility probe for the argument that it is necessary to 
differentiate between behavioural and ideological radicalisation as two separate and distinct 
processes and has demonstrated that much research on radicalisation, particularly the phase 
models that enjoy prominent attention among policymakers, shares the same fundamental 
assumptions about how these two are sequenced. This research assumes that behavioural 
radicalisation can only occur after ideological radicalisation. However, this paper draws on 
insights from participation in genocide to advocate for social movement and 
socialpsychological conceptions that allow for the possibility of an alternative sequencing that 
see people behaviourally radicalise for a number of other non-ideological reasons; 
subsequently, this behavioural radicalisation is often followed by ideological radicalisation in 
order to avoid the development of cognitive dissonance due to a moral disconnect between 
these radical actions and the non-radicalised moral framework the individual adhered to. This 
argument strengthens the position of social movement theorists in the study of radicalisation 
who have long argued that social relations are fundamental to understanding recruitment into 
terrorist groups; this article takes this argument further to advocate for a complex view of 
radicalisation which allows for both kinds of sequencing to occur in different cases.  
In this article I have sketched a conceptual specification of how this sequencing works, 
and have discussed how it resonates with the empirical literature on participation in genocide. 
While it has also drawn on some empirical studies in the field of radicalisation for illustrative 
purposes, it has not provided a full empirical test of the argument. This article is designed as a 
plausibility probe, but the next step after rendering these ideas conceptually plausible, would 
be to test them more thoroughly empirically. First tests will need to fundamentally re-evaluate 
empirical data in the form of primary data, as most studies already approach the cases from 
the vantage point of the classical sequencing, meaning that any information about alternative 
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sequencing is rendered invisible. Given the burgeoning literature on radicalisation, however, 
there should be plenty of cases which lend themselves to such an empirical test. Possible 
empirical testing could include a case study of an individual who actually follows this 
alternative sequencing; alternatively, a cross-case comparison of various individuals who 
proceed differently through the sequencing could productively be employed to understand 
when and where this alternative sequencing occurs; also, a broader statistical analysis of many 
individuals’ possible or actual trajectories could be fruitful, drawing on datasets such as the 
Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) dataset82 or on 
experimental survey data along the lines of Abrahms’ work.83  
For the moment, I have drawn on insights from research on radicalisation within 
genocide to empirically illustrate how this alternative sequencing works for another form of 
political violence, while providing a conceptually founded plausibility probe as to how 
behavioural radicalisation can occur without previous ideological radicalisation. While 
research on radicalisation in terrorism and genocide is interested in the same fundamental 
questions, there are obviously differences between the phenomena which can have an impact 
on my argument. First, radicalisation in terrorism occurs against the majority and against the 
state, with radicalisation being synonymous with an increasing “rejection of the status quo;”84 
it is a rejection of majority values and hostility towards the state, for example, of liberal 
democracy when talking of terrorism in the West. On the other hand, in genocide this 
radicalisation normally occurs in the context of a radicalising or radicalised state which 
purports radical policies; as such, radicalisation is not a rejection of the state, the majority and 
its values, but instead embracing the increasingly radical state ideology. The radicalising state 
itself is rejecting previous values and is promoting increasingly hostile preferences towards a 
specific outgroup, and these can be taken on in ideological radicalisation or hostile behaviours 
in behavioural radicalisation. Second, in the case of genocide, while ideological radicalisation 
can occur across society, oftentimes behavioural radicalisation is limited to certain groups 
(often just the security service, in other cases such as Rwanda also civilian groups) and 
institutional membership in the group often precedes the genocide and any possible 
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ideological radicalisation. But within these groups, not participating in behavioural 
radicalisation is deviant from the majority, rather than radicalisation being deviant as it is in 
terrorism. 
This article should be understood as support for social movement theory approaches to 
understanding terrorism and as a systematic portrayal of an alternative sequencing that can be 
used to critically evaluate our current understandings of radicalisation in terrorism. I am not 
arguing that the alternative sequencing is always applicable, not even that it will normally be 
the most useful explanation for individuals’ radicalisation, but that it is empirically prevalent 
for other types of violence, and should thus be considered a plausible explanation as part of 
models in the study of terrorist radicalisation and that it can occur empirically. As such, it 
may assist us in garnering more nuanced insight and is particularly important when we reflect 
on how the various radicalisation models discussed above also have concrete manifestations 
in how policy is made to counter radicalisation processes. If ideological radicalisation does 
not necessarily precede behavioural radicalisation, this will have important repercussions on 
early warning systems of who may potentially become behaviourally radicalised and on how 
this can be prevented. 
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